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RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND NONERGODICITY
IN THE DETERMINATION OF
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS:
A POST KEYNESIAN ALTERNATIVE TO
POSNERIAN DOCTRINE IN THE
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the conflict between those who recognize the desirability of
an effective public sector and social regulation against those who
wish to minimize the reach of the democratic public realm and con-
centrate power in private hands, the jurisprudence on regulatory tak-
ings has become an active and important battlefield.' On the one
hand, there are those who wish to use the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause2 as a means of imposing a prohibitively high cost on
government regulation on the use of land so as to effectively prevent
significant government influence on private decisions. On the other
hand, there are those who wish to limit the reach of the Takings
Clause and the application of the just compensation requirement to
physical takings and extreme regulatory situations. By doing so,
government regulation can be freed to be an effective tool in
1. The importance of regulatory takings is reflected in a relatively recent
report prepared by the Congressional Budget Office. See CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, REGULATORY TAKINGS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (1998), avail-
able at http:llvv.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index--1051Ssequence=OSfrom-5.
This type of report has, of course, generated critical reactions. See, e.g., C.
FORD RUNGE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE'S "REGULATORY
TAKINGS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE": ONE-SIDED AND UNINFORMED
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Envtl. Policy Project ed., 1999).
2. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
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exercising society's interest in the public use of real and personal
property.
Central in the modem analysis of regulatory takings is the con-
cept of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" (RIBE). The
destruction of such expectations by a government regulation is a key
element in a court finding that a regulatory taking by the government
has occurred. When that happens, the government is required to pay
just compensation to the party whose property was taken because the
government regulation destroyed their RIBE.
The problem with the use of RIBE in takings jurisprudence is
that RIBE is a rather ephemeral concept that can be used to suit the
political perspectives of a particular court. Such malleability creates
an undesirable legal uncertainty for both government regulators and
private property owners. It would be to the benefit of both parties if
RIBE could be redefined to incorporate greater scientific content, re-
duce its malleability, and increase legal certainty.
The special significance of expectations in determining invest-
ment has long been recognized in the economics literature-at least
since John Maynard Keynes developed his seminal General Theory.
4
Central to Keynes's articulation of the nature of expectations is the
recognition that "[u]ncertainty, as opposed to mathematical risk, is a
pervasive fact of life.",5 This perspective puts Keynes at odds with
3. The concept of reasonable "investment-backed expectations" was first
introduced as a factor in takings analysis in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
4. Keynes's General Theory was most thoroughly articulated in his mag-
num opus, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (First Harbinger ed. 1964) (1936). In
Keynes's General Theory, investment depends on long-term expectations, is
influenced by liquidity considerations, and generates direct and indirect expen-
ditures that are usually insufficient to generate full employment. See id. at
147-64, 222-54. Important components of his General Theory were created in
his prior work, as well as developed in his later expositions. See, e.g., Johan
Deprez, Rediscovering the Missing Visionary of the Middle Way: A Review of
Skidelsky on Keynes, 17 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECoN. 313, 320-23 (1995).
5. Tony Lawson, Uncertainty and Economic Analysis, 95 ECON. J. 909,
909 (1985). With respect to the expectational concepts employed in this
Comment, a certain degree of priority should be recognized in the work of
Frank Knight. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
(Augustus M. Kelley 1964) (1921) (distinguishing between the roles of risk
and uncertainty in determining economic profits).
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"the viewpoint of economic orthodoxy which essentially presupposes
certainty of foresight."
6
Economic orthodoxy provides the foundation for the Law and
Economics school of thought.7 Its key practitioners are central advo-
cates of imposing extreme limits on government regulation 8 and are
regularly cited by those judges who wish to push these types of con-
straints. 9 Hence, if one were to apply Keynes's perspective on ex-
pectations to the issue of regulatory takings, then, because this eco-
nomic perspective is different than the orthodox perspective, the
analysis of regulatory takings will necessarily be different than that
applied by those following the Posnerian perspective of the Law and
Economics school.
The goal of this Comment is to propose ways in which RIBE
can be substantially grounded so as to remove some of the legal un-
certainty associated with the regulatory takings analysis. In order to
do this, the economics and statistics literatures are utilized. In par-
ticular, the Post Keynesian school of economic thought's conception
of expectations and uncertainty is drawn on.'0 The Post Keynesian
perspective is itself based upon the statistical dichotomy between er-
godic and nonergodic contexts." An ergodic context is one where
6. Lawson, supra note 5, at 909.
7. The Law and Economics school of thought is based upon the Chicago
variant of neoclassical economics and finds its most well-known articulation in
the work of Richard Posner. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
8. See id. at 61-68.
9. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d
874, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., concurring) (citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992); ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45-46 (1988); and RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
281 (1985)), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 34 (2000).
10. The original articulation of Post Keynesian economics as a distinct
school of economic thought recognizes Keynes's view on expectations and un-
certainty as a central point of departure. See Alfred S. Eichner & J.A. Kregel,
An Essay on Post-Keynesian Theory: A New Paradigm in Economics, 13 J.
EcoN. LITERATURE 1293, 1293-95, 1309-10 (1975).
11. The incorporation of the ergodic/nonergodic dichotomy into the Post
Keynesian paradigm is due to the work of Paul Davidson. See, e.g., Paul Da-
vidson, Rational Expectations: A Fallacious Foundation for Studying Crucial
Decision Making Processes, 6 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 182 (1982-83)
[hereinafter Davidson, Rational Expectations], reprinted in 2 PAUL DAVIDSON,
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there is no structural change, so that the statistical observations of
one period coincide with those of another period and those of all pe-
riods combined. 12 A nonergodic context is one where there is struc-
tural change so that the statistical observations of one period do not
coincide with those of other periods and those of all periods com-
bined.
13
From this Post Keynesian basis, R!BE can be developed into a
more coherent concept. Building upon this new, coherent view of
RIBE, a test is suggested to distinguish between situations in which
the investment-backed expectations are reasonable and where they
are not. In an ergodic context, expectations may be substantive and
reasonable enough to hold that regulations may result in a taking and
that an amount of just compensation may be determined. In a noner-
godic context, expectations are predominantly speculative, so that a
regulation is not capable of destroying any reasonably substantive
expectations because such reasonably substantive expectations do
not and cannot logically exist. Hence, in a nonergodic context one
cannot find that a regulatory taking has taken place and, conse-
quently, no compensation needs to be paid by the government to the
property owner.
Part II of this Comment reviews the jurisprudence of regulatory
takings and the role of RIBE therein. Part III explores the concept of
reasonable investment-backed expectation in some detail. Part IV
discusses how the Posnerian perspective on law and economics looks
at regulatory takings. This part also points the way to alternative
economic paradigms for addressing the issue. Part V explains the
INFLATION, OPEN ECONOMIES AND RESOURCES: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS
OF PAUL DAVIDSON 123 (Louise Davidson ed., 1991) [hereinafter DAVIDSON,
INFLATION, OPEN ECONOMIES AND RESOURCES]; Paul Davidson, A Technical
Definition of Uncertainty and the Long-Run Non-Neutrality of Money, 12
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 329 (1988) [hereinafter Davidson, A Technical Defini-
tion], reprinted in 2 DAVIDSON, INFLATION, OPEN ECONOMIES AND
RESOURCES, supra, at 159.
12. See, e.g., GEORGE R. COOPER & CLARE D. MCGILLEM, PROBABILISTIC
METHODS OF SIGNAL AND SYSTEM ANALYSIS 100 (1971). Flipping a fair coin
is an example of an ergodic system because the odds of heads or tails do not
change over time and fifty percent of the outcomes would be heads in any sin-
gle time-period or all time-periods combined.
13. See id. The likelihood of discovering planets-inside and outside the
solar system-varying with historical time-periods is an example of a noner-
godic system. See infra Part V.
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dichotomy between ergodic and nonergodic contexts, and the signifi-
cance thereof, for formulating expectational concepts. Part VI ex-
plains and develops the economic distinction between industrial and
speculative activity and how these concepts relate to the er-
godic/nonergodic dichotomy. Building upon these economic foun-
dations, Part VII then describes a Post Keynesian perspective on
regulatory takings. From this perspective, a legal test is then pro-
posed in Part VIII to distinguish between ergodic and nonergodic
contexts and the reasonableness of investment-backed expectations.
The application and implications of this test are then discussed. Part
IX concludes by reemphasizing the advantages of a Post Keynesian
perspective on regulatory takings over the Posnerian alternative.
II. REGULATORY TAKINGS AND INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS
In modem jurisprudence, government regulation of private
property interests may be significantly constrained by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This clause states no more than:
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation.', 14 It provides that the federal government may not take
private property for public use without paying just compensation.
The Takings Clause also applies to the states, based upon the incor-
poration doctrine, through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.!5
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The early foundations for the incor-
poration doctrine were, in fact, initially laid out in a takings case where the
Court found the principle of just compensation to be "fundamental" in consid-
ering the taking of part of a railroad's right-of-way. See Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.4.1, at
504 (1997) (indicating that, via Chicago, Burlington, the Takings Clause "was
the first provision of the Bill of Rights to be applied to the states"); ALLAN
IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS §
1.3, at 9 (1998) (identifying Chicago, Burlington as the initial step in the ab-
sorption process of constitutional provisions into the Fourteenth Amendment).
More recently, the Court cited Chicago, Burlington when stating that "of
course [the Takings Clause] is made applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
122 (1978).
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Initially, the Takings Clause addressed the confiscation of pri-
vate property by the government. This vision has been greatly ex-
tended. The original idea is captured in the modem idea of physical
takings. Not only has the category of physical takings been ex-
panded, but the courts now also recognize regulatory takings in
which there is no physical confiscation at all.
16
A. Physical Occupations and Invasions
The classic taking occurs when the government physically oc-
cupies or invades private property or allows others to do the same.
The traditional situation occurs when the government uses its powers
of eminent domain to take over private real property in order to build
a road, bridge, or other similar public infrastructure.17
The degree of physical invasion may be very small. In Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 1 8 the Court found a per se
taking where the City of New York required apartment building
owners to allow cable television companies to install television cable
in their buildings.' 9 The small amount of physical invasion involved
had no bearing upon whether an invasion had occurred or not.20 It
only affected the amount of just compensation that the city should
have to pay the apartment owners.21 Similarly, a permanent invasion
occurs where the state gives the public an easement to cross a private
beach at any hour of the day or night.22 Physical invasions that are
temporary, as opposed to permanent, may not be takings per se.
23
B. Regulatory Takings
Takings Clause jurisprudence has been extended to situations
where government regulations impose restrictions on what private
16. See generally Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 121-22 (stating that an upsetting
of reasonable expectations can constitute a taking).
17. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington, 166 U.S. at 258 (holding that a taking exists
where the City of Chicago takes part of the railroad's right-of-way in order to
widen a street).
18. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19. See id. at 421-26.
20. See id. at 437-3 8.
21. See id.
22. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
23. See IDES & MAY, supra note 15, § 3.5, at 111-13.
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property owners may do with their property. When the nature or
extent of these regulations cause a large enough interference with a
private property owner's rights, the court will hold that a regulatory
taking has occurred for which just compensation must be paid.
While courts are generally more tolerant of regulatory interference
with property than interference caused by physical invasion-be-
cause they recognize the possible problems of hampering governance
by overly extending the regulatory taking concept-there is also the
attitude that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing.",24 The trick, of course, is trying to determine what "too far" is.
While there is no set formula for determining what "too far" is,
one may delineate three different types of regulatory situations: (1)
where property owners are arbitrarily singled out for adverse treat-
ment, (2) where the property is stripped of virtually all use or value,
or (3) where RIBE of the property owner are destroyed.25 A signifi-
cant number of regulatory taking cases deal wvith RIBE-the most
difficult of the three possible situations and the focus of this Com-
ment.
26
What is key, and easy to understand, is the idea that one wants
to prevent regulations from arbitrarily imposing a burden on par-
ticular property owners, while not imposing the same burden on
similarly situated property owners. The potentially problematic
question one needs to address is how one defines "arbitrary" and
"similarly situated." For example, when building restrictions are im-
posed on historical landmarks, the singling out of these buildings is
usually not a regulatory taking if there is a clear landmark designa-
tion plan.27
The second category in which regulatory takings are found is
where the regulation effectively deprives the property owner of all
economically beneficial use or value of the property. These rare
situations of "confiscatory regulations" or "total regulatory takings"
24. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
25. See IDES & MAY, supra note 15, § 3.6 at 114.
26. See THOMAs J. MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, COMPENSATION FOR
REGULATORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 4-6
(1996).
27. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131-33
(1978).
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are found where a government regulation deprives the property
owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of his or her
land, so that it must be left economically idle.28 The Court has ex-
plicitly recognized that it draws an arbitrary line between a total dep-
rivation of economic value and a deprivation marginally less than
total. 29 The determination of the appropriate parcel of land in these
types of situations is, of course, crucial.3 °
Finally, a regulatory taking occurs when the government regula-
tion defeats the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the
property owner.31 While the destruction of these expectations is an
important factor in many cases, it is ground for finding a prima facie
taking only where the government has given specific assurances to a
property owner upon which she has relied.
3 2
III. REASONABLE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS
Reasonable investment-backed expectations is the central con-
cept driving much of regulatory takings jurisprudence. The original
appearance of "distinct investment-backed expectations" occurred in
1978. 33 This term and its alternative "reasonable investment-backed
profit expectations" have been repeated a number of times in
28. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1029 (1992)
(holding a regulatory taking existed where a beachfront landowner was pre-
vented from building a permanent structure).
29. See id. at 1019 n.8.
30. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d
874, 875-77 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing that, in examining whether a regu-
lation preventing the owner of an apartment building from subdividing the lot
and building townhouses on the former lawn of the apartment building is a
regulatory taking, the court first needs to determine whether the relevant parcel
of land is the property as a whole or the subdivided lots from the lawn before
proceeding to a Lucas analysis), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 34 (2000).
31. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122-24.
32. When a property owner is given explicit assurances that a project is
permissible, this creates well-founded expectations, so that when a government
regulation later outlaws the project and destroys these expectations, the gov-
ernment must pay just compensation to the property owner. See Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
33. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (holding that the severe frustration of
distinct investment-backed expectations may amount to a taking of property).
[34:12211228
REGULATORY TAKINGS
later opinions.34 These terms have, however, left most observers
rather confused and looking for a way to make the concept more
concrete.
35
To understand the concept of RIBE one must realize that it is
really only one of three elements of the balancing test initially devel-
oped in Penn Central.36 The three main factors to be considered in
the Penn Central balancing test are: (1) the character of the govern-
ment action, (2) the regulation's economic effect on the party claim-
ing a taking has occurred, and (3) the effect of the regulation on the
claimant's RIBE.37 In practice, however, the RIBE factor tends to
dominate.
When determining the character of the government action, there
is an inquiry to see if there is "a general regulation with a legitimate
public purpose." 38 The regulation's economic effects on the claimant
may include the question of whether the regulation has made the
property unprofitable to maintain or whether it creates an insufficient
rate of return of the property.39 Depending upon one's conception of
RIBE, these expectations are likely to include a profitability compo-
nent.
When examining the use of the concept of RIBE, one must re-
alize that "the Court is confused about the meaning of this term, fed-
eral and state courts divide on how to apply it, and its role in taking
law remains a puzzle. ' 40 Initially, RIBE was considered a minor part
34. See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-
28 (1986) (holding that amendments to ERISA did not interfere with reason-
able investment-backed expectations); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1005-10 (1984) (holding that, although trade secrets are protected under
the Takings Clause, they are entitled to just compensation only when a "rea-
sonable investment-backed expectation" is destroyed).
35. See Bruce W. Burton, Post-Lucas Regulatory Takings and the Supreme
Court's Riddle of the R.LB.E.: Where No Mind Has Gone Before, 25 U. TOL.
L. REv. 155, 155-62 (1994).
36. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
37. See id.; see also Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 198
F.3d 874, 882-84 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (repeating and applying the three factors of
the Penn Central balancing test), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 34 (2000).
38. Dist. Intown, 198 F.3d at 883.
39. See id.
40. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Lm,
27 URB. LAw. 215,215 (1995).
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of the takings analysis. However, with the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Lucas,4 1 courts have become more comfortable in basing
their decisions predominantly on whether the government regulation
"wrongly interfered with the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions of the landowner," even to the extent of disposing of cases
solely on this element.42
Given this rather confusing history and state of affairs of RIBE,
this Comment seeks to inject substance and clarity into the situation.
By making use of particular statistical and expectational concepts as
employed by certain Post Keynesian economists, a taxonomy will be
arrived at that leads to a simpler way to decide when expectations are
reasonable enough so that it is possible that a government regulation
destroyed them. If employed, this taxonomy will make takings juris-
prudence much easier to understand and apply.
IV. TAKINGS, ECONOMICS, AND EXPECTATIONS
The analysis of regulatory takings is inexorably intertwined with
economic theory, policy, and effects. RIBE must, therefore, also be
understood in the context of these economic considerations. Eco-
nomics helps us understand the context in which expectations are
formed, how expectations are formed, the link between investment
and expectations, and the social impact of expectations formation
and investment decisions. Examining these issues leads to policy
recommendations and suggestions for legal rules.
A. The Posnerian Perspective on Takings
The preeminent scholar of the Law and Economics school of
thought is Chief Judge Richard Posner.43 His work is based upon the
Chicago School of economics, a sub-school of the broader Neoclas-
sical paradigm to economics. 44  Posner and his colleagues have
41. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
42. Robert M. Washburn, "Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations"
as a Factor in Defining Property Interest, 49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 63, 95-96 (1996).
43. See POSNER, supra note 7 (starting with the first edition in 1973, this
book provides the key statement of the Law and Economics paradigm).
44. Economics, like all other sciences, has a variety of conflicting para-
digms. Dominant in the United States today is Neoclassical Economics. Neo-
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extended their perspective on the economic analysis of legal issues to
a wide range of topics, including suicide, sexual behavior, adoptions,
and drug use.
45
The orthodox Law and Economics paradigm treats the Takings
Clause as a check on the government's potentially wasteful use of its
taking power.4 6 The requirement of just compensation imposes a
cost on the government for the property that is taken, so that a ra-
tional government will not engage in taking unless the social benefits
thereof exceed the just compensation costs. 47 By using the fair mar-
ket value of the property to determine the amount of compensation-
assuming efficient markets-this will limit the government to engage
in only socially-efficient takings where the social benefits exceed
this private cost.
48
If there was no just compensation or insufficient just compensa-
tion, the orthodox perspective then argues that the government would
treat the private property taken as a completely or partially free good
and would, consequently, engage in too many physical and regula-
tory takings.49 For some, of course, having the proper amount ofjust
compensation means that the government should never engage in any
takings and that all economic decisions should be left to an efficient
private market.
classical Economics contains a number of variants, with different labels, which
depend upon the author and the topic being examined. In contrast to this "or-
thodox" paradigm there exist a variety of other paradigms. These "heterodox"
paradigms include the Institutionalist, Marxian, Neo-Ricardian (Surplus Ap-
proach), Post Keynesian, Neo-Schumpeterian, Socio-Economics, and Austrian
perspectives. See, e.g., MARC LAVOIE, FOUNDATIONS OF POST-KEYNESIAN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-41 (1992) (providing a good introductory discussion
on the limits of neoclassical economics, the need for an alternative, and the ap-
propriate alternative paths).
45. See, e.g., WILLLAT M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, S X AND
REASON (1992); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Free
Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986); Michael
J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in Family
Law: A Lav and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 533 (1991).
46. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7, at 61-68.
47. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 191-205.
48. See id. at 198-201.
49. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 331-34.
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B. Takings Analysis Under Broader Neoclassical Analysis
Even within the broad neoclassical framework that also forms
the basis for the Chicago School approach embodied in the Posnerian
perspective, it is easily argued that a proper analysis of takings would
be much more sympathetic to government regulation than the Pos-
nerian view. One such perspective is the "New Haven" school that
recognizes that in some situations there may be insufficient regula-
tion, as opposed to too much regulation.
50
Once one recognizes that markets may fail on both the supply
and demand sides of the market and that production and consumption
externalities may be created by the operation of a market, then it may
be the private property owner that creates uncompensated social
costs by using her property. Government regulations (and the threat
thereof) are then a means by which society can curtail the negative
externalities and promote the positive externalities generated by pri-
vate property owners. When there are market failures, such regula-
tions may be a necessary means by which to generate more efficient
economic results.
51
C. Alternative Economic Perspectives
Many legal commentators imply that there is only one "econo-
mists' perspective" and that economics is a homogenous science.
52
That single perspective is usually taken to be the Posnerian approach,
or neoclassical economics more broadly.53 Nothing, however, could
50. See Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Schools of Thought in
Law and Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 65, 81-84 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K.
Braun eds., 1995).
51. See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS,
PROPERTY, LITIGATION 137-55 (1997) (providing a mathematical model that
can incorporate both the broader neoclassical approach as well as the narrower
Posnerian perspective).
52. Asserting that there is only one economic perspective is, of course, self-
serving and intellectually dishonest (as well as lazy). To argue that one's per-
spective is the most appropriate one, while recognizing that there exist plausi-
ble alternatives, is the intellectually honest path to meaningful debate and pro-
gress.
53. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d
874, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., concurring) (stating "[t]he econo-
mist's justification for the Takings Clause," followed by a citation to Posner
1232 [34:1221
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be farther from the truth. There are many competing economic per-
spectives and paradigms.
Since the beginning of modem economics, it has been a field
ripe with rich debate. In fact, Adam Smith's The Wealth of Na-
tions54 -the often referred to starting point of modem economics-
was itself a creative amalgamation of two different schools of eco-
nomic thought: Mercantilism and the Physiocrats. 55 Debates be-
tween different economic schools of thought have existed, persisted,
and developed ever since. Modem economics is rich With altema-
fives to the neoclassical orthodoxy and, especially, the Posnerian
perspective.
D. Heterodox Alternatives to Posnerian Orthodoxy
In opposition to the neoclassical or Chicago School perspec-
tives, there exist a variety of other economics paradigms.5 6 In one
way or another, these heterodox perspectives reject key foundational
elements of the orthodox schools of thought. Some of the heterodox
perspectives-like Institutional Economics-have a long history of
examining the interrelationships between law and economics. 57 In-
stitutional Economics is one heterodox perspective that has main-
tained a vibrant, if small, presence in the discussions of economics
and law.58
and similar remarks), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 34 (2000).
54. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Dent & Sons 1947) (1776).
55. See Andrew S. Skinner, Smith, Adam, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 357, 362-67 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
56. See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 50 (discussing an alternative to the
orthodox Law and Economics school of thought); see also NICHOLAS
MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER
TO POST-MODERNISM (1997) (discussing the development of different para-
digms in law and economics).
57. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM
(Transaction Publishers 1995) (1924) (providing an early contribution to the
interaction of law and economics by one of the founding fathers of Institutional
Economics).
58. See WARREN J. SAMUELS & A. ALLAN SCHMID, LAW AND ECONOMICS:
AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); Steven G. Medema et al., Institu-
tional Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICs 418,
419-20 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1996-2000), available
at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/lit/0520book.pdf.
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Post Keynesian economics, as a much newer explicit paradigm
in economics, is a newer entrant to the discussions of law and eco-
nomics. 59 Post Keynesian economics recently started to find a pres-
ence in legal academic literature.
60
Post Keynesian economics has four distinguishing characteris-
tics. 61 First, economic actions by firms and individuals are under-
stood to be taking place within a context of true uncertainty, instead
of the orthodoxy's full certainty or risk context.62 Second, a model
based in historical time, rather than one based in logical or mechani-
cal time, is the most appropriate abstraction for analyzing the econ-
omy.63 Third, oligopolistic market structures are seen to dominate
modem economies, in contrast to the usual orthodox assumption of
perfect competition. 64  Fourth, the social nature of income
59. For the first time, a panel on Post Keynesian Economics and Law
(Mathew Forstater, Johan Deprez, and Timothy A. Canova) participated in the
American Association of Law Schools meeting in San Francisco on January 3,
2001. See Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCH., PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE: LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES, ANNUAL MEETING
JANUARY 3-6, 2001, at 4-5 (2001).
60. See, e.g., Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation:
Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 559-62 (1998) (finding that
heterodox Post Keynesian economics gives a much better foundation for ana-
lyzing financial questions in legal matters than does orthodox economics);
Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the
Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1571-1645 (1999) (ap-
plying a Post Keynesian perspective to the analysis of the banking and finance
industries in the United States and Mexico); Timothy A. Canova, Financial
Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/order, and the Neoliberal State, 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1279, 1283-90 (2000) (discussing the modem intema-
tional monetary system and certain Post Keynesian perspectives on its opera-
tion).
61. See Johan Deprez & John T. Harvey, Introduction to FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVES 1, 2-3 (Johan
Deprez & John T. Harvey eds., 1999); see also Eichner & Kregel, supra note
10, at 1294 (emphasizing four distinguishing characteristics as dealing with
"(1) growth dynamics, (2) distributional effects, (3) the Keynesian constraints,
and (4) the microeconomic base").
62. See Deprez & Harvey, supra note 61, at 2. This allows for the logical
existence of money and unemployment. See id.
63. See id. This means that qualitative change is important and that the or-
thodox general equilibrium model is an inappropriate abstraction. See id.
64. See id. at 3. This means that market power, markup pricing, and insti-
tutional behavior are important to modem macrodynamics. See id.
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distribution is important in explaining the dynamics of advanced
capitalist economies, as opposed to technology and thrift that explain
income distribution in orthodox economics.
65
One important way to get to these types of distinguishing char-
acteristics is by rejecting certain central orthodox axioms. The or-
thodox axioms that need to be rejected are, in addition to the neu-
trality of money axiom, "the gross substitution axiom that asserts that
everything is a substitute for everything else and.., the axiom of an
ergodic economic environment, the presumption that future eco-
nomic events can be reliably predicted by studying the economy's
past market price data."
66
Because most economic schools of thought-especially the ones
built on neoclassical foundations-make the ergodic assumption,
they are immutable reality models. Only a few models-of which
Post Keynesian and Institutionalist theories are the most important
representatives-employ a transmutable or creative reality model.
They do so because they explicitly or implicitly reject the ergodic as-
sumption.
67
E. Heterodox Economics and Dynamic Change
One particularly persuasive theme that appears time and again in
a broad variety of heterodox economic paradigms is the emphasis on
the importance of dynamic change in modem economies. Heterodox
economics finds a fatal flaw in the adherence of orthodox economics
to a static methodology within which no meaningful qualitative
change can be incorporated. The heterodox alternatives propose a
65. See id. Therefore, Post Keynesian economics rejects the marginal
product theory of income distribution put forth by neoclassical economics. See
id.
66. PAUL DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A
FOUNDATION FOR SUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 17 (1994) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN
MACROECONOMIC THEORY]. The neutrality of money axiom is the idea that
the amount of money in the economy does not affect any real variables, such as
output and employment, and only affects the aggregate price level. See id. at
15-16. Gross substitution means that all goods are-to one degree or an-
other--substitutes for each other. See id. at 17-18.
67. See Paul Davidson, Reality and Economic Theory, 18 J. POST
KEYNESIAN ECON. 479, 482 (1996) [hereinafter Davidson, Reality].
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methodology that highlights persistent qualitative change arising
from normal economic activity as a fundamental tenet.
68
Part of the problem with orthodox economics is that much of its
methodology is based upon Newtonian physics. This "physics envy"
creates severe limitations on the types of economic issues that ortho-
dox economics can handle. Crucial among these is that orthodox
models are ones in which decisions by economic actors do not
change the economy in a qualitative fashion. In contrast to these
models with a predetermined and immutable history stand heterodox
models that focus on the qualitative nature of economic decisions in
changing and developing the economy.
69
V. ERGODIC AND NONERGODIC CONTEXTS
One important argument regarding how the distinction between
orthodox static theory and heterodox dynamic theory can be
grounded relies on the statistical dichotomy between ergodic and
nonergodic contexts.70 The basic distinction between the two con-
texts has been defined as follows:
Some stationary random processes possess the property
that almost every member of the ensemble exhibits the
same statistical behavior that the whole ensemble has.
Thus, it is possible to determine this statistical behavior by
examining only one typical sample function. Such proc-
esses are said to be ergodic.
A process that does not possess [this] property ... is non-
ergodic.
71
68. See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 50, at 95-108 (outlining key char-
acteristics of the Institutionalist approach to law and economics, including the
"central themes of evolution, interdependence, and order").
69. See Davidson, Reality, supra note 67, at 479-83 (distinguishing between
predetermined, immutable models and transmutable models, and linking this
distinction to the distinction between ergodic and nonergodic contexts).
70. This distinction between ergodic and nonergodic contexts is a common
one recognized in the statistics literature. See, e.g., COOPER & MCGILLEM, sU-
pra note 12, at 100 (incorporating in their advanced statistical discussion of
random processes the distinction between ergodic and nonergodic random pro-
cesses as distinct from stationary and nonstationary random processes).
71. Id. (footnote omitted).
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These authors point out that one usually assumes ergodicity
when dealing with physical processes, unless there are solid reasons
to reject the assumption.72 This is done even though it is hard to di-
rectly justify the ergodic assumption when dealing with physical
processes.
73
The initial articulation of this distinction between ergodic and
nonergodic contexts and its importance for uncertainty, expectations,
and choice of economic paradigms is found in the work of Paul Da-
vidson.74 Davidson extended and developed this concept numerous
times in articulating the Post Keynesian vision of modem econom-
ics. 75 Other Post Keynesians have further developed and applied this
fundamental concept of the Post Keynesian paradigm.
76
Because there occurs no meaningful structural change in an er-
godic context, orthodox economic theory may be an appropriate
methodology to deal with events in such a context. On the other
hand, a nonergodic context is generated and perpetuated by qualita-
tive dynamic change. Orthodox theory cannot logically apply in this
context and a heterodox alternative needs to be looked to. By recog-
nizing that a nonergodic context is fundamental to accurately ad-
dressing most economic questions, important implications arise for
72. See id.
73. See id. ("It is generally difficult, if not impossible, to prove that er-
godicity is a reasonable assumption for any physical process, since only one
sample function of the process can be observed. Nevertheless, it is customary
to assume ergodicity unless there are compelling physical reasons for not doing
so.").
74. See Davidson, Rational Expectations, supra note 11.
75. See, e.g., DAVIDSON, POST KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY, su-
pra note 66; Davidson, A Technical Definition, supra note 11; Paul Davidson,
Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian Perspective,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 129 (1991) [hereinafter Davidson, Is Probability Theory
Relevant]; Davidson, Reality, supra note 67; Paul Davidson, Reviving Keynes's
Revolution, 6 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 561 (1984), reprinted in 1 PAUL
DAVIDSON, MONEY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF PAUL
DAVIDSON 567 (Louise Davidson ed., 1990) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, MONEY
AND EMPLOYMENT].
76. See, e.g., Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, Keynesian Economic Poli-
ciesfor the New Millennium, 108 ECON. J. 181 (1998); Fernando J. Cardim de
Carvalho, Keynes on Probability, Uncertainty, and Decision Making, 11 J.
POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 66 (1988); David Dequech, Expectations and Confi-
dence Under Uncertainty, 21 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 415 (1999).
Ap.ril 2001] 1237
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
the proper characterization of expectations, investment, and uncer-
tainty.
A. Statistics, Economics, and Law
The law seems to be skeptical-to an extreme-of using statisti-
cal methods to analyze problems, develop theories and tests, and de-
termine damages. For example, courts quickly deem expectational
damages to be too speculative under circumstances that would sur-
prise scholars outside law.77 In contrast, the social sciences perva-
sively use statistical methods to analyze a wide variety of issues. In
economics, for example, the applications of statistical theory range
from modeling how an individual makes decisions to models of how
the macroeconomy fluctuates and grows.78
As part of developing the arguments of this Comment, a scheme
for organizing legal thinking about the appropriateness of statistical
techniques arises. This scheme points out in which contexts the
law's skepticism is healthy and when the usual application of statisti-
cal techniques is inappropriate. This scheme differentiates these
contexts from one where common statistical techniques are appropri-
ate for use in handling legal issues, and the law's skepticism, conse-
quently, comes across as paranoia.
To do this, this Comment draws upon theory developed to chal-
lenge the inappropriate use of statistical techniques in economics.
Simply put, this theory distinguishes between an ergodic context, in
which there is no structural change, only "risk" exists, and traditional
theory may be applicable, from a nonergodic context in which there
is structural change, true uncertainty exists, and traditional statistical
techniques are inappropriate. By categorizing legal problems as fit-
ting into one or the other of these contexts, the possible relevance of
traditional statistical techniques is easier to analyze.
77. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Amanda Kay Esquibel, Yardstick Damages
in Lost Profit Cases: An Econometric Approach, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 113
(1994).
78. See, e.g., G.S. MADDALA, ECONOMETRICS 4-9 (1977).
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B. The Ergodic Assumption and Orthodox Economic Theoy
The vast majority of traditional science is built on the usually
implicit assumption of ergodicity 7 9 In the realm of economics, Paul
Samuelson explicitly recognized this.8O The ergodic assumption is,
in essence, an assumption that one is analyzing a system within
which there is no structural change occurring.8' This means that
classical statistical theory can only be applied to the scientific study
of such unchanging systems.
A system is ergodic when the probability distribution from
which events are drawn at any point in time is identical to the prob-
ability distributions from which events are drawn at any other point
in time.82 As such, the space (cross-sectional) averages-the results
obtained by observation at any point in time-approach each other
and will converge to the time averages-the results obtained over
time. Such a system can accurately be seen as a "Monte Carlo" or
"Las Vegas" world where actual events occur based on the same
probability laws that govern games like roulette, baccarat, blackjack,
craps, and coin tosses.
An example can illustrate the ergodic concept. Logically, we
know that the probability of a fair roulette wheel generating a "0" on
any one spin is 1/38.83 This probability will not vary whether the
roulette wheel is in Las Vegas, Monte Carlo, Macao, or the Baha-
mas. This is the probability today; it was the probability yesterday,
last week, last year, and a hundred years ago; and it will be the prob-
ability tomorrow, next week, next year, and in a hundred years. If
one observed the results from all the spins at all these casinos at all
these different times, then one would see that each set of observa-
tions would generate essentially identical results so that each of these
cross-sectional or space averages would be statistically identical to
79. See Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant, supra note 75, at 129-31.
80. See P.A. Samuelson, Classical and Neo-classical Monetary Theory, in
MONETARY THEORY 170, 184-85 (P.W. Clower ed., 1969) (acknowledging
that orthodox economics implicitly embraces the "ergodic hypothesis").
81. See Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant, supra note 75, at 132.
82. See id.
83. Roulette is a game that uses a spinning wheel where a small ball can
land in one of thirty-eight equally small holes, numbered 1 through 36, 0, and
00.
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each other and would also match the time averages generated by
putting all of this data together.
C. The Significance of the Ergodic Assumption for Expectations
By accepting the assumption that the world is ergodic, orthodox
economists are limited to narrow views on how knowledge, informa-
tion, and uncertainty are treated by the agents in their economic
models.
Knowledge about economic processes can be obtained in one of
two ways. First, one can simply study the game itself and, by
knowing the possible events, determine the probability of particular
results. To understand what the chances are of tossing heads with a
fair coin, one does not need to toss a coin an infinite number of times
and take accurate measures thereof. Simply studying the game and
its rules will do. This can, however, only relate to simple games.
In a more sophisticated world, however, such direct study may
not be possible. The alternative method is to rely on meticulous and
repeated empirical observations in order to judge what the correct
probability distribution is. While one would have to make sure that
the measurement was correct and sufficient, in an ergodic world one
would not have to worry about the timing of the observations be-
cause all time-series observations are drawn from an identical prob-
ability function.
Prediction in such a world is very straightforward. Because the
probability function from which real events come does not change
with time, once one properly identifies this probability distribution
from past and present information, then one can unambiguously pre-
dict future outcomes on a probabilistic basis. The future is certain in
a probabilistic sense. One knows "on average" what the future re-
sults of the economy will be. Hence, one has a world in which there
is nothing but "risk" in the sense that only the specific individual re-
sults are unknown as to when they will occur. Coin heads will show
up with a given probability, but one does not know on which toss.
Thus, there is nothing in the past, present, or future of an ergodic
world that is not knowable. The only asymmetry that exists between
the past and the future is that the future is only knowable in a prob-
abilistic sense, while the past can be known exactly. One can know
exactly the recorded historical sequence of observations and, in an
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ergodic world, the probabilistic functions from which they come.
Hence, the only possibility for mistakes that exists in such models is
when there are impediments to understanding the past or to obtaining
information about the past. Only then is the actor making decisions
that can result in true mistakes. Such exogenously introduced rigidi-
ties are the basis for ergodic economic models which use imperfect
information arguments. From this perspective, persistent mistakes
are a rather strange and counterintuitive occurrence for rational
agents.
Ergodic models are, by their very nature, ahistorical. The rela-
tionships between economic variables are timeless. The economy
can thus be seen as governed by immutable "natural" laws. The eco-
nomic events that occur have no qualitative impact on the economic
structure. All economic decisions are "quality-less" in that they can-
not have any effect on the probability distributions that generate eco-
nomic results.8 4 Economic actions in an ergodic world do not change
what the economy has to offer.
D. The Definition of Nonergodicity
A nonergodic system is the diametric opposite of an ergodic
system. A nonergodic system is a stochastic system where the prob-
ability distribution governing events at one point in time is different
than the probability distributions governing processes at other points
in time.8 5 This means that the cross-sectional or space averages are
different at different points in time, and that these cross-sectional or
space averages are different from the time averages. In contrast to an
ergodic system, in a nonergodic system there is no tendency for these
space and time averages to converge.
A nonergodic system is one where the probability distributions
governing events change over time. It is as if the probability of a "5"
occurring yesterday is governed by a fair roulette wheel, today it is
governed by the rolling of two dice, and tomorrow by drawing a card
from a fifty-two card deck. The underlying structure which governs
events is incessantly changing. The space or cross-sectional
84. See NICHOLAS GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAW AND THE
EcoNoMic PROcESS 63 (1971).
85. See Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant, supra note 75, at 136-37
(discussing predictions based on past experiences).
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averages generated by each one of the three different games are nec-
essarily different. 86 The observed occurrences of a particular number
will not be the same on any of the three days. In fact, there are some
numbers possible on one day that are not possible on another day.
These cross-sectional averages will also not coincide with the time
averages created by putting all the observations of the three days to-
gether.
E. The Significance of Nonergodicity for Expectations
The rejection of the ergodic assumption of orthodox economics
is a key starting point for modem Post Keynesian economics. 87 Ac-
cepting that the world is fundamentally nonergodic requires the in-
troduction of a completely different view of knowledge, information,
uncertainty, and prediction than what is put forward by orthodox
economics. Basically, the economic actor deals with an ever-
changing world. If she interprets reality rationally and with any de-
gree of accuracy, she realizes that the future will be qualitatively dif-
ferent from the past.
In a nonergodic world, knowledge of the past, no matter how
thorough and complete, does not give information sufficient to de-
termine the probability distributions from which future events will be
generated. In a nonergodic world, this historical information relates
to different probability distributions from those that govern future
events. Observing outcomes of spins of a roulette wheel and deter-
mining the probabilities associated with roulette does not tell you
what the probabilities are with a game of cards.
86. The probability of a "5" showing up in roulette is 1/38; in dice it is 1/9
(probability for a total value of five from the two dice); and in cards it is 1/13.
87. Paul Davidson initially pointed out that the rejection of each of the er-
godic assumption, the axiom of reals, and the axiom of gross substitution are
fundamental to building a useful monetary theory. See DAVIDSON, POST
KEYNESIAN MACROECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 66, at 4-18. Such a well
articulated monetary theory is a key component of Post Keynesian economics.
See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Keynes and Money, in KEYNES, MONEY AND
MONETARISM 2 (Roger Hill ed., 1989), reprinted in 1 DAVIDSON, MONEY AND
EMPLOYMENT, supra note 75, at 389; Johan Deprez & L. Randall Wray,
Monetary Theory of Production, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
759 (Phillip Anthony O'Hara ed., 1999).
[34:12211242
REGULATORY TAKINGS
Yet, even facing true uncertainty, people make decisions. The
wisdom of these decisions will only be known when the future hap-
pens. People make decisions and act speculating that the future will
turn out to be consistent with their hopes.
VI. INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY VERSUS SPECULATION
In the economics literature there has long been made a distinc-
tion between industrial and speculative activity.8 8 Industrial activity
is productive from a social point of view and should, therefore, be
promoted by public policy. Speculative activity, on the other hand,
has negative or, at best, neutral effects on economic output and em-
ployment. If negative effects are generated, then speculative activity
should be discouraged as a matter of public policy.89 This dichotomy
between industrial and speculative activities interrelates with issues
such as the ergodic/nonergodic distinction, what types of investment-
backed expectations are reasonable, and what types of expectations
should be protected from government regulation.
The logical existence of speculative activity requires the rejec-
tion of the orthodox economics' restrictive ergodic assumption.
Within an ergodic context, all future events are statistically foresee-
able. This means that speculation is logically impossible because
there are no guesses to be made about an unknown future. Only if
one is dealing with a nonergodic context is speculation likely be-
cause there is logical room for guesses about a truly unknown and
uncertain future.
Post Keynesians, following the ideas of Keynes, argue that the
future is uncertain. This means that at any point in time, the actuarial
profits or reliable expectations of gain cannot be calculated from any
existing data set.90 Keynes himself specifically stated that in ortho-
dox economics:
[F]acts and expectations were assumed to be given in a
88. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY 250-59 (1930).
89. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Wzy the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation
and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701
(1999) (providing a history of antispeculation rule in American law and dis-
cussing alternative theories of speculation, including the importance of the dis-
tinction between risk and uncertainty).
90. See KEYNES, supra note 4, at 161-63.
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definite and calculable form; and risks... were supposed to
be capable of an exact actuarial computation. The calculus
of probability ... was supposed to be capable of reducing
uncertainty to the same calculable status as that of certainty
itself....
•.. I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself
one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal
with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know
very little about the future.
... [A] classical economist... has overlooked the precise
nature of the difference which his abstraction makes be-
tween theory and practice, and the character of the fallacies
into which he is likely to be led.91
In Keynes and Post Keynesian analysis, therefore, even if "fun-
damentals" of any investment or stock exist today, such fundamen-
tals do not form a reliable foundation for forecasting the future.
Within a nonergodic system, today's fundamentals are not a reliable
actuarial guide to the future. As such, no market of goods, services,
real property, or financial assets can be presumed to be efficient.
Today's markets and the information they provide can, in a noner-
godic system, never be an accurate predictor of future outcomes.
92
Speculation in such a context occurs because guesses on profits
and returns are being made about an uncertain future in order to mo-
tivate decisions. Because logical people in an uncertain, nonergodic
environment know that today's fundamentals do not provide a statis-
tically reliable guide to the future, they also recognize that many of
their investment decisions are, at least partially, based on pure
speculation. In such a world, protecting the value of one's assets
against unforeseen and unforeseeable changes in market values be-
comes an important economic activity. People will try to guess how
91. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q. J.
ECON. 209 (1937), reprinted in 14 THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES: THE GENERAL THEORY AND AFTER, PART II: DEFENCE
AND DEVELOPMENT 109, 112-13, 115 (Donald Moggridge ed., 1973).
92. See, e.g., Paul Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic
Crude Oil Industry, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 85 (1963), reprinted in 2 DAVIDSON,
INFLATION, OPEN ECONOMIES AND RESOURCES, supra note 11, at 275-76.
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other speculators in a market will behave. Entering into hedging
contracts is another way to deal with the uncertain future.
93
Following Keynes, in a nonergodic system, firms, households,
and other economic agents are always uncertain about future market
valuations and try to adjust to this fact:
Now a practical theory of the future [profits or market
valuation is] ... based on so flimsy a foundation, it is sub-
ject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of calm-
ness and immobility, of certainty and security, suddenly
breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning,
take charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion
may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valua-
tion.
94
Speculation about the psychology and behavior of other market
players can result in herd-like behavior that can become self-
reinforcing and self-justifying. In a nonergodic system, if enough
people possess the same faulty expectations, the result can be that
these faulty expectations actually create future outcomes.
95
The characteristics of real property markets mean that they can
be very speculative markets. Real property markets, like financial
markets, involve essentially nonreproducible items that are practi-
cally indestructible. Real property markets also involve active sec-
ondary markets that allow for the ongoing valuation of properties.
These markets are, of course, not as well-organized and liquid as fi-
nancial markets, commodities markets, and the markets for certain
produced goods. This illiquidity is a factor that may contribute to
sharp price fluctuations. Just like financial markets, the speculative
expectations of economic agents drive real property markets. Con-
sequently, such market prices cannot reflect social costs and benefits
nor can they reflect the actual costs and benefits of improvements
upon the land. Therefore, real property markets are generally highly
speculative and inefficient.
93. See, e.g., Pouncy, supra note 60, at 572-73 (discussing how hedging-
being active on both sides of a transaction-helps firms deal with uncertainty).
94. Keynes, supra note 91, at 114-15.
95. See Arestis & Sawyer, supra note 76, at 188-89.
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VII. REGULATORY TAKINGS FROM A POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE
The dichotomy between ergodic and nonergodic contexts leads
to a distinction between risk-based investments and uncertainty-
based investments.96 Risk-based investments are those investments
that are carried out based upon probabilistically-certain profit ex-
pectations. Uncertainty-based investments are those investments that
do not have such a certainty foundation and are, therefore, based on
uncertain profit expectations that make these investments specula-
tive. Reasonable investment-backed expectations can logically exist
when one is dealing with risk-based investments. When dealing with
uncertainty-based investments, however, the expectations driving
these investments cannot be reasonable. Hence, a government regu-
lation can only destroy reasonable investment-backed expectations
when one is addressing risk-based investments. When dealing with
uncertainty-based investments, there are no reasonable expectations
for a regulation to destroy. Consequently, a regulatory taking can
only occur if one has a risk-based investment and the necessary er-
godic context.
A. Risk-Based Investments
If the expectations upon which the investment decision is based
are reasonably grounded in an ergodic context, then one is dealing
with a risk-based investment. In this context, investments are carried
out on the basis of probabilistically-certain profit expectations. Con-
sequently, investments work like games of chance such as roulette,
craps, or flipping a coin. If, for example, on a bet of $1.00, heads
pays $3.00 and tails pays nothing, then, with a fair coin, the expected
value of the bet is $1.50. 97 The probabilistically-certain profit ex-
pectation is $0.50 per flip of the coin.98  Making this bet or
96. The dichotomy between probabilistically-certain risk and uncertainty,
where this certainty does not exist, goes back to the work of Knight. See
KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 197-232 (distinguishing the meaning of risk and un-
certainty).
97. The expected value (EV) of the payout is equal to the probability of
each outcome times the amount of the associated payout added to the same
product for all other outcomes, i.e. EV = (.50 x $3.00) + (.50 x $0.00) = $1.50.
98. The expected profit (EP) is the expected value minus the cost of the bet,
i.e. the net expected proceeds. Here, EP = $1.50 - $1.00 = $0.50.
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investment is a risk-based investment. There is no uncertainty about
what the outcome will be when the bet is made, only risk of what
will happen on a specific flip of the coin.
Furthermore, expectations in such an ergodic context are based
upon objective foundations. Hence, reasonable investment-backed
expectations are associated with these risk-based investments. Con-
sequently, a government regulation that significantly alters the rules
of the game inevitably destroys expectations with such an objective
foundation. If, in the example above, the government regulation
changed the probability of heads to twenty-five percent and tails to
seventy-five percent, then, on the same payout $3.00 for a head and
nothing for a tail, the expected value of a flip becomes $0.75. 99
There is now a probabilistically-certain expected loss per flip of
$0.25.100 This change destroyed reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations. Therefore, the government regulation that destroyed the
RIBE can be held to be a taking for which just compensation of
$0.75 per flip can be determined. 10 1
B. Uncertainty-Based Investments
Uncertainty-based investments are those investments that are not
or cannot be based upon probabilistically-certain profit expectations.
Because the investment-backed expectations for these investments
are grounded in a nonergodic context, both broadly and within the
narrow industry context of the investment, these investments are
necessarily highly speculative in nature. The uncertainty of the ex-
pectations created by the nonergodic context means that these ex-
pectations cannot be meaningful in an objective sense and, therefore,
cannot be reasonable. Thus, if there are no RIBE to begin with, then
a regulation has no RIBE to destroy, and a regulatory taking for
which compensation is required cannot take place.
When investment-backed expectations are projections about the
uncertainty in a nonergodic context, the investment is a highly
speculative one. Under these conditions it becomes impossible to
attach an objectively meaningful value to the investment. Even if a
99. EV = (.25 x $3.00) + (.75 x $0.00) = $0.75.
100. EP = $0.75 - $1.00 = -$0.25.
101. The just compensation is the difference between the expected profit of
$0.50 before the regulation and the expected loss of $0.25 after the regulation.
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taking was held to have occurred, there is no objective, independent
monetary value that could be attached to the loss.
Under these conditions, the investor could only have undertaken
the investment on the basis of a purely speculative return. If she
were a rational person, the investor would have recognized that her
choice to invest was based only on intuition, hope, and subjective
calculations. To then suffer a partial or total loss on the investment
would not be a surprise.
In a nonergodic context, one knows that structures and funda-
mental characteristics of the economy are going to change. The bet
is that they will change in a way that will benefit the speculator.
When unexpected and unforeseen changes occur in economic, tech-
nological, social, political, or legal-including regulatory-condi-
tions, the investor should not be surprised. It is not a surprise to the
investor when her expectations end up being disappointed. Hence,
under such conditions, it is part of the bet that there may be changes
in government regulations that will substantially change the eco-
nomic context and severely alter the profitability of an investment.
Consequently, in a nonergodic context, the logically rebuttable pre-
sumption is that there is no regulatory taking.
Currently-existing market prices are useless in that they do not
reflect future profitability. They cannot help us in understanding
what future social value is lost or gained by a regulation. Prices of
assets in an uncertain context reflect only the speculative expecta-
tions of what people hope the future will be.'0 2 If the market partici-
pants have no reasonable basis for these expectations, then the mar-
ket prices are purely speculative, do not meaningfully reflect future
economic conditions, and will change purely on actions based on a
speculative mindset. 10 3 Consequently, some of these markets tend
102. See, e.g., Johan Deprez, Technology and the Terms of Trade: Consid-
ering Expectational, Structural, and Institutional Factors, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES
435, 439-40 (1995) (arguing that exchange rates are not and cannot reflect any
fundamentals).
103. Keynes discussed the fact that, in this context, prices are expectation-
ally-driven and are only based on the speculators' mindset. See KEYNES, su-
pra note 4, at 156-77 (explaining the speculative and subjective nature of mar-
kets, as well as why herd behavior is a common reaction of speculators to
changes in this context).
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to be dominated by the large institutional traders and speculators,
without reflecting any meaningful fundamentals. 1
C. The Destruction of Reasonable and Speculative Expectations
Whether a regulatory taking has occurred depends on whether
one is dealing with risk-based investments or uncertainty-based in-
vestments. If one has risk-based investments, then one has reason-
able investment-backed expectations. These expectations are some-
thing substantive that a regulation can destroy to create a regulatory
taking. The value of the investment can also be substantive enough
to determine an amount of just compensation. If, on the other hand,
one has uncertainty-based investments, then there cannot be reason-
able investment-based expectations. One is dealing with speculative
expectations. Here, there is nothing substantive for a regulation to
destroy. No regulatory taking can exist and no just compensation
could be calculated in a reasonable manner.
VMI?. A SUGGESTED TEST FOR EVALUATING ERGODIC
AND NONERGODIC CONTEXTS
From the foregoing discussion it is useful to arrive at a legal test
for distinguishing between investment-backed expectations that are
grounded in an ergodic context and those that are grounded in a non-
ergodic context. This is essentially a test to determine the reason-
ableness of the expectations held by the investing party. This test is
applicable to investments in real property, as well as investments in
most other economic sectors, whether carried out by business firms
or individuals.
A. Is There Ergodicity at the Industry Level?
The first fundamental question is whether the specific industry
about which the investor formulated expectations is one that has es-
sentially reflected an ergodic pattern of development. This can be
104. See, e.g., John T. Harvey, Exchange Rates: Volatility and Misalignment
in the Post-Bretton Woods Era, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICs: POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECIVES, supra note 61, at 200 (arguing
that the volatility of exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods era is not linked
to fundamentals but to speculative activity led by currency traders).
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captured by the following factors:
1. Is the industry one in which important structural changes
have taken place, are taking place, or will take place? For
example, has the industry transformed itself from a highly
competitive one to one that is oligopolistic or exhibits sig-
nificant monopoly or monopsony power?'
0 5
2. Is the industry one that has experienced significant techno-
logical changes? For example, is the industry rapidly devel-
oping new products, using new capital goods, or employing
new production processes?
3. Is the industry one in which the skills of its labor force have
changed significantly? For example, has the predominant
part of the labor force moved from unskilled or semi-skilled
laborers to highly-skilled technicians?
4. Is the industry one in which prices have fluctuated signifi-
cantly? This refers especially to prices of the output of the
industry, but could also mean the prices of inputs that the in-
dustry uses.
5. Have the markets, which the industry deals with, changed
significantly? For example, has there been a significant
globalization of the relevant market both in terms of where
local firms are selling and in terms of foreign firms selling to
the local market?
6. Have there been changing regulatory structures in the indus-
try? One should note that the nonexistence of significant
regulation usually only indicates a newly developing indus-
try that can logically expect the imposition of a regulatory
structure in the near future. It rarely indicates an explicit
choice of nonregulation.
These six factors do not necessarily create an exhaustive list of
the relevant factors to be considered. There may be other sources of
significant change indicative of a nonergodic environment. Many of
these factors are similar to those found in product life-cycle analysis.
New and immature industries generally reflect a nonergodic
105. Monopoly is a market in which there is one seller facing many buyers,
while monopsony is a market in which there is one buyer facing many sellers.
See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 9, at 37 n.8.
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environment of rapid and unexpected changes. Computer hardware
and software industries are probably the most recognizable examples
of this situation. Mature industries would be the ones that tend to
exhibit an ergodic environment. The automobile and beer industries
may be approximations thereof. A mature industry that is showing
serious signs of collapse would begin to fall into the nonergodic
category.
B. Is There Ergodicity at the Econony Level?
The second fundamental question arises if the first, industry-
specific analysis results in an answer that the industry about which
expectations were generated is essentially ergodic. If so, then the
next question is whether the broader economic and social context
over the time period that the party is formulating expectations about
can reasonably be categorized as ergodic.
The ergodicity or nonergodicity of the economy as a whole can
be determined by identifying whether important, economy-wide
changes have occurred. These changes could be in terms of signifi-
cant changes in the stages of the business cycle that an economy is
in, as may be indicated by the growth rate of gross domestic product
(GDP), the growth rate of employment, and the unemployment rate.
Significant changes in the rate of inflation or the rate of interest may
also be indicia of nonergodicity. Rapid technological progress and
significant changes in the relative importance of economic sectors
may also rupture the conditions required for ergodicity. Sharp fluc-
tuations in exchange rates or trade deficits and surpluses may indi-
cate the same. Significant political upheaval via revolutions and
wars may also rip apart the structural stability required for er-
godicity. Natural disasters or supply shocks, such as an energy cri-
sis, may also create structural change substantial enough to indicate
that the time period in question is a nonergodic context.
C. Combining the Answers to the Two Fundamental Questions
If the expectations at both the level of the industry and the level
of the economy in general are dealing with an essentially ergodic en-
vironment, then the investment-backed expectations are concrete
enough for regulatory takings to be a meaningful concept. A rela-
tively objective value for the investment can be determined.
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Therefore, the value of what was lost due to the government regula-
tion and the required just compensation can be determined. Here, it
is clear that the regulation in question creates a special rupture in the
temporal environment.
If at either one of the levels of analysis one finds that one is es-
sentially dealing with a nonergodic environment, then investment-
backed expectations are too fleeting to be a meaningful concept upon
which to determine that a regulatory taking has occurred. There is
just no way to arrive at a relatively objective or socially meaningful
valuation of the investment. Under such conditions, the investor in
property took her speculative chances and lost. New regulations are
as likely as other unexpected changes in a nonergodic environment.
Hence, regulations that fully or partially destroy investment-backed
expectations are no different than any economic or social factor that
would do the same. Losing-getting less value than expected-in a
changing environment because of the changes that occur in an unex-
pected manner is just part of the capitalist game. Investors should
not be compensated for such losses. Regulation took nothing from
that investor that the investor had in the first place. The government
regulation created no special rupture in the economic environment.
Applying the above test to individuals, as opposed to businesses,
may generate significantly different outcomes. Individuals tend to
buy property in a relatively stable context. When buying a house to
live in, the homebuyer's primary purpose is not speculative. If
housing prices, property taxes, mortgage interest rates, and insurance
premiums all grow at relatively stable and similar rates, and there are
no major crises in the economy as a whole, then it is clear that the
homebuyer is dealing with an ergodic context. A government regu-
lation-such as allowing toxic waste to leech into the soil and
groundwater of a housing development-that effectively destroys the
habitability of the house would clearly be a regulatory taking under
this test.
IX. CONCLUSION
The recognition of a nonergodic context and true uncertainty
creates insurmountable logical problems for Chicago-style econom-
ics and the Posnerian perspective on law and economics that has
been built upon Chicago-style economics. Posnerian views on
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efficiency, prices, valuation, decision making, and justice cannot be
sustained in the real world where true uncertainty dominates.
Meaningful foundations for examining the interrelationship between
law and economics must thus be found in heterodox perspectives to
economics, such as those provided by Post Keynesian and Institu-
tionalist Economics.
By applying the Post Keynesian perspective to expectations that
is built upon the dichotomy between ergodic and nonergodic con-
texts, one is able to develop a substantive foundation for reasonable
investment-backed expectations. Expectations can only have a sub-
stantive and objective foundation if they are referring to an ergodic
context. Only then can they be "reasonable." Within such an er-
godic context, some of the concerns of orthodox economists and le-
gal scholars with respect to regulatory takings may have some merit.
In an ergodic context, expectations can be reasonable enough so that
there is something substantive that government regulation can de-
stroy and for which a meaningful just compensation amount can be
determined.
But, investments are generally long-term decisions that require
long-term expectations about the distant future. If this future is sub-
ject to persistent structural change, then we are dealing with a noner-
godic context. Expectations within this context-no matter how con-
fidently held-cannot have an objective basis. Consequently, these
expectations are purely speculative. An investor profits if the future
turns out as she hoped it would, and suffers a loss if her hopes are
disappointed. Either way, this is not predictable in any substantively
objective fashion in a nonergodie context.
As expectations are purely speculative in a nonergodic context,
there is nothing of any substance that government regulation destroys
when investment-backed expectations are destroyed. Because in-
vestors' expectations cannot be reasonable, their expectations cannot
form the basis for finding a regulatory taking. The property owner
must bear the risk, not society. That is the game the capitalist entre-
preneur and investor must face.
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